Turning a Blind Eye: The Politics of Policing

‘Political interference’ in policing is in the News once more following the arrest and questioning of Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams with regard to the 1972 IRA murder of Jean McConville.  On the face of it, this is a simple matter: if Mr Adams was criminally involved in her horrific death he ought to be charged, tried, convicted and sentenced; if not, he ought to be released from custody and given an apology. 

This analysis, however, depends on strict adherence to the principle that justice must be blind to every factor other than the guilt or innocence of individuals who, rightly or wrongly, have been implicated in a crime. The police ought to investigate all suspected crimes with vigour and the courts ought to apply the law without fear or favour.  Straightforward as it sounds (and much as I should like to endorse it), there are problems with this approach.

In the first instance, what about crimes that ought not to be classified as such?  In the UK it used to be a crime for consenting adults to engage in ‘homosexual acts’.  Was it just for the police and the courts blindly to pursue the application of this law?  Similarly, ought police to be banging on the doors of countless adolescents’ bedrooms (not to mention those of their parents) at the first whiff of cannabis-laden smoke when police resources are stretched and there is little evidence that such a pursuit would have any positive effect?

Even in cases of murder, criminal proceedings are not always the best way forward.  In the aftermath of the appalling Rwandan genocide the only way to heal a traumatised society was to exchange criminal proceedings for reconciliation procedures that blended guilt with forgiveness rather than conviction with punishment.  There is also little doubt that the Northern Ireland Peace Process would have foundered had a blind eye not been turned to some criminal paramilitary activity while negotiations were ongoing. 

It is clearly unacceptable for police and the judiciary to be simple extensions of political parties or governments. In such cases all hopes of impartial policing disappear as can be seen, for example, in the recent history of Egypt.  The criminal justice system, however, cannot fail to be a reflection of the society in which it is imbedded.  That means that ‘political’ decisions have to be made all the time with regard to which crimes to pursue.  At times, in order to effect personal, communal and social cohesion or healing, a blind eye might have to be turned or an alternative approach taken, although such policies ought to be rigorously justified in every single instance. That this should be so is an unsavoury admission of human failure and impotence, but to pretend otherwise does justice to no one.