Dying to Die

Assisted Suicide is currently a hot topic in the UK. An important Supreme Court judgment was published at the end of June, current and former Archbishops of Canterbury have clashed publicly on the issue and a significant debate on the subject is scheduled to take place at the end of this week in the House of Lords.

Many arguments have been presented in favour of changing the current ban on assisted suicide; just as many have been presented opposing change.  These have covered ethics, philosophy, law, and a host of social theories and attitudes, all of which are important to take into account when trying to decide whether or not assisted suicide ought legally to be permitted.

When all is said and done, however, the Supreme Court has highlighted what is likely to be the crucial, deciding factor in the debate: ‘The question requires a judgment about the relative importance of the right to commit suicide and the right of the vulnerable, especially the old and sick, to be protected from direct or indirect pressure to do so. It is unlikely that the risk of such pressure can ever be wholly eliminated. Therefore the real question is how much risk to the vulnerable is acceptable in order to facilitate suicide by others who are free of such pressure or more resistant to it’. This, it seems, is where the rubber hits the road.

In attempting to influence opinion, both sides in the debate have highlighted compassion as being central to the issue. ‘If we are compassionate, how can we refuse to help someone who is suffering to end his or her own life?’ say proponents of change. ‘If we are compassionate, how can we abandon vulnerable people to pressure from others or from acting out of a sense of guilt, to “stop being a burden?” ’ say advocates of the current law.

Those pushing for change often take a hopelessly optimistic view of human nature; history and current affairs tell us that some people truly are malevolent and that their misdeeds are not easily prevented (for example, over 500,000 elderly people suffer abuse in the UK each year).  Equally, opponents of change often appeal too readily to a Utopian view of palliative care that simply is not reflected in reality.

The impasse can only be resolved by someone making a sacrifice. I balk at the thought of asking vulnerable, isolated individuals to do so. Individuals who freely wish to control the time and means of their own deaths are surely better placed to make such a sacrifice for the good of others.  Perhaps one day, truly effective safeguards against abuse can be found, but, to date, all proposals fall well short of that mark. Self-denial is not frequently promoted or valued in our society, but this is one case where it could helpfully occupy centre-stage.